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Abstract 
This study examines whether and how firms can design novel incentives to engage customers in 
this social sharing era. In collaboration with a leading online deal platform, we conduct a large-
scale randomized field experiment and two lab experiments to test the effectiveness of different 
incentive designs (varied by shareability and scarcity of promotion codes) in driving social 
sharing senders’ purchase and referrals. We find that providing senders with one non-shareable 
promo code significantly increases their purchase likelihood but does not influence their referrals. 
In contrast, the senders who receive one shareable code are less likely to purchase themselves yet 
are more likely to make successful referrals. Meanwhile, the incentive design with two codes that 
has one non-shareable code and one shareable code increases neither the senders’ purchase nor 
their successful referrals. We further conduct two lab experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
to explore the underlying mechanisms of the observed relationships.  
 
Keywords:  social sharing, incentive design, randomized field experiment, lab experiments 
 
Introduction 
Online social platforms such as Facebook, Pinterest, Groupon and LivingSocial have significantly boosted 
the prevalence of social sharing by making it convenient for customers to distribute product information 
within their social connections (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). A substantial volume of product information 
is being shared on these platforms every day (Nielsen 2016). Recognizing the trend, a large number of 
businesses have leveraged the online social platforms and channels (Facebook, Twitter, Yelp) and embraced 
social sharing as an effective approach to drive organic traffic (John 2013, Godes et al. 2005). Social sharing 
is now increasingly enabled by digital technology and becomes an IT artifact. For instance, major 
Ecommerce platforms such as Groupon and Amazon has all integrated social features and channels on its 
product pages to facilitate immediate sharing of the products with friends (Huang et al. 2018). While the 
impact of IT-enabled social sharing and WOM on customers’ decision is intensively studied in a number of 
seminal papers (Godes et al. 2009, Yin et al. 2016), the implications of such IT-enabled social sharing on 
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the design of firm’s direct communication strategy to the customers has been largely ignored in both 
academic research or practical study. Specifically, given the increasing connectivity among customers and 
the very low cost of social sharing enabled by IT, it is important for firms to revisit their current practice in 
the social media era: Should firms engage customers as isolated and independent ‘purchasers’, or as both 
‘purchasers’ and ‘sharers’ that are interconnected to each other? How should firms design incentive 
differently to engage the customers across both roles? Our study is aiming to address these questions.  
Despite the importance of promotional incentive design as a key strategy in firm’s communication with 
customers, to the best of our knowledge, no study has directly examined this question with the 
consideration that the customers have the motives and can increasingly share with each other. The idea of 
designing targeting incentives that accommodate or even encourage social sharing remains vastly under-
explored. Previous research on social sharing has mostly focused on understanding the reasons why social 
sharing occurs (Wasko and Faraj 2005; Berge and Milkman 2012), how to encourage social sharing 
behaviors (Ryu and Feick 2007), how to better design social sharing programs (Hong et al. 2017, Sun et al. 
2017), and the impact of social shares on others’ purchase behaviors (Aral and Walker 2011; Bapna and 
Umyarov 2015; Kim and Srivastava 2007). Our study aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining how 
firms can engage users involved in social sharing through optimal incentive designs. We theorize and 
empirically demonstrate that firms could take advantage of IT-enable social sharing and leverage 
customers’ sharing motives (e.g. other-regarding motives) in designing incentives when reaching out the 
customers. If well designed, social sharing among customers may help firms overcome the information 
asymmetry in targeting and allocate the promotional incentive to the right customers with the best fit in 
preference. In this way, both firm’s profits and the customer welfare may be significantly improved. 
The goal of our study is two-fold. From a theoretical perspective, our study aims to shed light on the motive 
underlying customers’ social sharing behaviors. Previous literature carefully examined the sharing motive 
in the lab setting (Hong et al. 2016, Berger and Milkman 2012), our study complements and extends the 
previous lab experiments and suggest a potential way to examine sharing motives in the field. The response 
of customers towards different incentive design (in terms of their purchase and referral behaviors) could 
indirectly reflect their consideration in organic sharing with friends and lead to advances in our 
understanding about the motives underlying social sharing in a rich business context with a large network 
of friends and a wide range of product offering. Understanding the motives of sharing is crucial in the 
literature of online WOM and referrals (Hong et al. 2017, Jung et al. 2018, Berger and Milkman 2012) and 
could potentially help explain the effectiveness of online WOM (e.g. Yin et al. 2014, 2016). 
From a practical perspective, our study suggests a new direct intervention (shareable incentive design) for 
firms to increase the customer conversions by leveraging social sharing among themselves. Although the 
sharing of a product indicates the purchase intention of potential customers, most of such ‘shares’ do not 
necessarily lead to successful conversions for neither the senders nor recipients involved in the share 
(Cespedes 2015). With the large amount of data available on social sharing, and the technological ability to 
target social sharers in real time, firms are now, for the first time, equipped to monetize sharing traffic, viz., 
converting senders and recipients in the shares into purchases. The opportunity size in converting the 
sharing traffic is immense. For instance, in our study context, the number of sharers exceeds millions per 
year on the platform but fewer than 6% of them purchase the shared product. Any increase in the conversion 
rate of social sharing traffic would translate to significant growth in the platform’s revenue and profit. The 
majority of these prior studies have focused on firms’ role in encouraging and moderating online social 
sharing (e.g., Godes et al. 2005, Ryu and Feick 2007) and overlooked the ability of firms to directly target 
and convert the users engage in social sharing. Our study is aiming to fill this gap. 
We conducted a large-scale randomized field experiment and a series of lab experiments to identify the 
causal effect of various incentive designs in engaging senders in making both purchase and further referrals. 
In particular, in the field experiment (Study 1), we explore the optimal design of financial incentives that 
vary in shareability and quantity with an eye toward their effects on the purchase behaviors of both senders 
and recipients involved in the social shares. The subjects in our field experiment are users who have shared 
a deal (senders) but are yet to make a purchase the following day. We randomly assign these senders to one 
of the five experimental groups characterized by different promotion incentives, and then evaluate the 
purchases of social sharing senders as well as their further referrals. The control group receives a simple 
reminder email, the first treatment group receives a reminder email containing one single-use and non-
shareable promo code usable by the sender, the second treatment group receives a reminder email offering 
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one single-use and shareable promo code that can be used either by the sender or shared with a recipient, 
the third treatment group receives a reminder email including two single-use promo codes, one non-
shareable and the other shareable, and the hold-out group has no treatments.  
We find evidence that the incentive designs have significant impacts on the purchase likelihood of the 
senders and the senders’ successful referrals, but in different ways. First, the treatment with one non-
shareable promo code to a sender significantly increases the sender’s probability of purchasing the shared 
deal, indicating that a non-shareable financial incentive can effectively stimulate the sender’s purchase in 
social sharing. Interestingly, simply varying the shareability of the promo code has a significant impact on 
the outcomes. We find that the treatment with one shareable promo code to a sender leads to a significant 
increase in the recipient’s but at a small cost of sender’s own likelihood of purchase. This interesting finding 
suggests that, when the promo code becomes shareable, a subset of sender is activated to become an 
influencer for the firm and refer her friend to purchase the deal using the shareable promo code (some even 
sacrificing their own benefits). An established stream of literature in psychology and economics has found 
consistent evidence in other context that people care not only about their own material payoff but also about 
others’ welfare, such as altruism, or warm glow (Khalil 2004; Wasko and Faraj 2005; Leider et al. 2009; 
Andreoni and Miller 2002). Finally, the two promo code treatment does not lead to any significant increase 
in sender’s purchase and referrals. In summary, the effects of incentive designs (either one non-shareable 
code or one shareable code) are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. Given 
the large volume of social shares on the partner platform, the estimated increase in profits from such 
intervention adds up to hundreds and thousands of dollars per year. It is notable that the partner platform 
of our field experiment has immediately adopted the shareable promo code design after our study. 
We further theorize and test the mechanisms underlying the effect of sharing incentive design on senders’ 
purchases and further referrals, respectively, using two carefully designed lab experiments on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The first lab experiment (Study 2) replicates the field experiment findings on 
the effect of three incentive designs on sender’s purchase, and further measures senders’ perception on 
those incentive designs. Drawing on previous literature, we explore plausible explanations. We propose that 
increasing either the shareability or the quantity (lack of scarcity) of the promo codes in the incentive design 
may negatively affect sender’s perception of exclusivity: the senders who receive the promotion may feel 
the incentive is not specifically designed for them. Thus, compared to the one non-shareable code, senders 
are less likely to purchase the shared deal when receiving one shareable code or two codes. And such a 
difference in treatment effect should be mediated by senders’ exclusivity perception. In the second lab 
experiment (Study 3), we replicate the main findings in the field experiment on sender’s successful referrals 
(i.e., one shareable code performs better than two codes), and further theorize that one shareable code 
design, as compared to that of two codes, are more likely to trigger altruism motive underlying sharing thus 
would lead to more successful referrals by the senders. Specifically, senders are more likely to share the 
promo code with closer friends when they believe that their sharing behavior would create a positive social 
image to the recipients. Based on the theorization, we measure the senders’ perceived altruism under 
various incentive design (one shareable code vs. two codes). We find that perceived altruism is higher under 
one code design and the senders reported that they have sacrificed their own benefits for the friend they 
give the promo code to. The enhanced altruism feeling leads to a higher likelihood of sharing codes with 
closer friends, which mediates the positive effect of incentive design on sender’s referrals. In summary, the 
two lab experiments further corroborate the main findings in the field experiment and help uncover the 
mechanisms underlying the effect of incentive design on senders’ purchase and further successful referrals.  
Literature Review and Contributions 
Our study makes several important contributions to academic research. To begin with, we contribute to the 
IS literature on Internet-facilitated social sharing and the design of online social sharing systems. While 
prior literature revolves around the idea that the consumers’ social influence in social sharing could lead to 
purchases (Aral and Walker 2011; Jing and Xie 2011; Bapna and Umyarov 2015; Godinho de Matos et al. 
2018; Hong et al. 2017), our study makes a pioneering effort to understand how firms can design 
interventions to accommodate customers’ potential role as a ‘social sharer’, as well as the relative 
effectiveness and tradeoffs of different incentive designs in driving customers’ purchase and referrals. As 
incentive design and social interactions are both integral components of IT artifact design (Ba et al. 2001; 
Hevner et al. 2004; Hong et al. 2017), our study bears a particular importance to considering social sharing 
as a significant IS problem. 
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Our study also contributes to the literature on targeted promotions (Sahni et al. 2014; Fong et al. 2016), by 
offering novel insights on the optimal design of targeting strategy for social sharing customers. Prior 
research has mostly focused on targeting customers in website and online search traffic (Ghose and Yang 
2009; Goldfarb and Tucker 2011). Sharing traffic is similar to website and online search traffic to the extent 
that such sharing is reflective of the sender’s own interest in the shared product (Luo and Zhang 2014). 
However, sharing behavior also fundamentally differs from online browsing and search behavior in two key 
aspects – first, a share could indicate the interest of the recipient, or the group (i.e., the sender as well as 
the recipient); second, a share reveals the sender’s strong willingness to share information with friends. 
Those two unique features indicate that firms should design their targeting strategy differently for sharing 
traffic. Specifically, firms can target the sender with novel incentives not only to improve her own adoption, 
but also to leverage her to influence and engage others. In this way our study extends the literature. 
From a practical perspective, the results of our study highlight how firms can leverage the underlying 
motives of social sharing senders to monetize sharing traffic by providing incentives. This study provides 
evidence for the multifaceted role of sharer motives in driving social sharing, by contrasting a series of 
incentive designs that speaks to different motivation of social sharing senders. Specifically, the act of 
sharing could reflect a sender’s self-regarding motive (i.e., sender's interest in the product), other-regarding 
motive (i.e., sender's interest in the recipient), or group-regarding motive (i.e., sender's interest in 
purchasing the product with the recipient) (List 2007, Chen and Li 2009). Such sharing motives can be 
inferred based on sender and recipient’s purchase histories. In the case of a self-regarding motive, providing 
direct incentives for the senders can be effective in stimulating purchases. Additionally, if the sender’s 
sharing is driven by other-regarding motive, then the sender is less likely to respond to the one non-
shareable promo code but is more likely to respond to the one shareable promo code by spreading the 
influence to the recipients. Under such circumstances, the firm could also benefit from providing incentives 
to the recipients. Finally, in the case of social events where senders and recipients are likely to benefit from 
joint consumption, the firm should provide incentives for both the sender and recipient to promote joint 
purchases. The findings not only provide immediate managerial implications to firms’ practice, but also 
help improve our theoretical understandings on social sharing phenomenon, especially the underlying 
motives that drive online sharing behaviors. 
Hypotheses 
We propose a set of testable hypotheses that guide our incentive designs in the field experiment. Our 
hypotheses reflect on prior research related to the underlying motives of social sharing behaviors, namely, 
self-regarding motive and other-regarding motive (e.g., List 2007; Chen and Li 2009) and also build on 
previous literature on the promotions (e.g., Sahni et al. 2014; Fong et al. 2016).  
Prior work has suggested that targeted promotions, such as product recommendations based on consumer 
preferences revealed in previous purchases, can effectively increase consumers’ direct responses to 
promotions (Ansari and Mela 2003; Fleder and Hosanagar 2009). Extending past research that mostly 
focused on customers in website traffic or online search traffic (Ghose and Yang 2009; Goldfarb and Tucker 
2011), our study considers the targeting of sharing traffic, an unexplored aspect in the prior literature. 
Customers in sharing traffic, similar to those in search and online website traffic, also exhibit valuable 
purchase interests that are useful for targeting (Lambert and Tucker 2013). However, while website and 
search traffic only concern the focal customers, sharing traffic involves the sender, the recipient and the 
sender and recipient duo. In particular, a sharing behavior could indicate the purchase interests of the social 
sharing sender, the recipient, or the group (i.e., the sender and the recipient). Thus, firms should look 
beyond the focal customer (i.e., the sender) and take into account the purchase decision of her social 
connections when designing the targeting strategy. Our hypotheses reflect such an idea, targeting the 
sharing traffic with novel incentives that consider the sender’s interests, the recipient’s interests as well as 
the sender-recipient duo’s common interests. 
In our study context, self-regarding motive represents the senders' own interests in the shared deal. The 
consumers who have shared the deal had at least viewed the deal and shown purchase interests (Luo and 
Zhang 2014; Li and Wu 2017). Additionally, the senders might be at the latter stages of the conversion 
funnel, who are interested in the deal but still need an additional nudge (e.g., in the form of an incentive) 
to move towards purchase (Moriguchi et al. 2016). In line with traditional economic theory that considers 
individuals being rational and utility-driven (Simon 1955; Simon 1981), ample research has documented 
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the effectiveness of financial incentives in motivating desired behaviors, from performing social shares 
(Huang et al. 2018), contributing online content (Burtch et al. 2017), to making purchases (Jedidi et al. 
1999; Ozpolat et al. 2013). Furthermore, monetary incentives, such as promo codes for price discount, 
provide consumers with not only utilitarian benefits (e.g., savings, higher value) but also hedonic benefits 
(e.g., opportunities for exploration) (Chandon et al. 2000). Integrating the argument above, we expect that, 
in the social sharing setting, the potential benefits of financial incentives like a non-shareable promo code 
are likely to activate the senders’ self-regarding motive and stimulate purchase behavior of the sender. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1a: The incentive design with one non-shareable promo code will increases social sharing senders’ 
purchase likelihood, as compared to the reminder. 
In addition, previous literature has documented the importance of exclusivity of incentives or product 
offering in driving a customer’s purchase decision (Baron and Roy 2010, Dreze and Nunes 2009, Chandon, 
Wansink, and Laurent 2000). Consumer values reflect the exclusivity of coupons, in addition to their 
monetary savings (Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000). Consumers tend to view exclusivity positively 
(Dreze and Nunes 2009), and some empirical evidence suggests that exclusive offers lead to higher 
redemption or conversion rates (Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang 2002). Increasing either the shareability or 
the quantity of the promo codes in the incentive may negatively affect the perception of exclusivity: the 
senders who receive the promotion may feel the incentive is not designed for them.  The lack of feeling 
special may decrease their likelihood of further engaging with the product. Thus, we may expect that the 
effect of one non-shareable promo code may be larger than those from the other two incentive design: 
H1b: The effect of one non-shareable promo code on the senders’ purchase likelihood is larger than the 
effect of one shareable code. 
H1c: The effect of one non-shareable promo code on the senders’ purchase likelihood is larger than the 
effect of two promo codes (one non-shareable and the other shareable). 
Other-regarding (a.k.a. altruistic) motive reflects the sender's interest in the recipient. Extensive literature 
in social psychology and behavioral economics has shown that other-regarding motive is a crucial element 
of human nature, and people care about the welfare of others (Krebs 1970; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). 
When activated, other-regarding motive may lead to pro-social behaviors with other-regarding motives 
(Kornish and Li 2010). As “nonreciprocal pro-social behavior,” social sharing can be motivated by other-
regarding motive that is intended as a courtesy or kindness to others (Benkler 2004). However, prior lab 
experiments (List 2007; Kahneman et.al. 1986) and observational studies (Lactera et.al. 2011) have also 
revealed the tension between self-regarding motives and other-regarding motives in individual decision 
making. Previous work show that individuals care not only about their own material payoff but also other's 
welfare, at least to some extent (Hoffman 1996; Andreoni and Miller 2002). Our study applies the idea of 
other-regarding motive to the setting of deal sharing. Specifically, we attempt to leverage the altruistic 
motive of social sharing senders by providing them with shareable incentives.  
When a social sharing sender receives a shareable incentive (i.e., a single-use shareable promo code), her 
other-regarding motive is likely activated because the shareable promo code provides her an additional 
opportunity to benefit her friend. In this scenario, the sender might act not only just as a purchaser, but 
also an influencer by passing on the shareable promo code to a friend (Manchanda et al. 2008). 
Nonetheless, since the shareable promo code is single use, viz., can only be used once, this shareable 
incentive design essentially creates a tension in sender’s decision-making process. The sender needs to 
choose between keeping the code for herself or sharing it with her friend. This could potentially lead to an 
interesting tradeoff between the sender’s own purchase and the purchase of the social sharing recipient. As 
compared to a non-shareable code which is likely to increase the sender’s own purchase, the shareability of 
the promo code is more likely to activate the sender’s other regarding motive, and we would expect this to 
lead to an increase in the likelihood of the recipients’ purchase (but may attenuate the sender’s own 
purchase). Formally, we hypothesize the following: 
H2a: The incentive design with one shareable promo code will increase the probability of a social sharing 
sender’s successful referral than the incentive design with one non-sharable promo code. 
Furthermore, prior research has found that there exists a positive reinforcement between people’s altruistic 
action and their perceived social image (Andreoni 1989, Ariely et al. 2009, Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 
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Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Such social image may be determined by how others would view the 
sender’s sharing action, as well as the sender’s own perception of her/his sharing behavior (‘warm glow’) 
(Lacetera and Macis 2010, Andreoni 1990).  As a result, considering the altruistic motive, individuals are 
more likely to engage in a social share when they believe that their sharing behavior would create a positive 
social image to the recipients, or is perceived as more desirable by themselves. The design of the incentive 
would influence the such perceived social image. Specifically, under the condition of one shareable code, 
the sender need to sacrifice her/his own benefits when sharing with others. Such tradeoff does not exist 
under the incentive involving two promo codes. Thus, from the sender perspective, the action of sharing 
(the incentive) may be perceived as more altruistic by both the recipients as well as herself/himself (Ariely 
et al. 2009). In addition, the additional altruism and social image may drive the senders to share with closer 
friends, for whom they care more. Thus, if senders’ other-regarding motive was in play, we would expect 
that under one promo code incentive, the sender is more likely to share, and will share the deal with close 
contacts, resulting in an increased purchase likelihood by the recipient (Kornish and Li 2010). In addition, 
because of the closer relationship, the sender will be more confident about the recipient’s interest there 
reinforce the impact of the shareable incentive on the recipient’s purchase. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H2b: The effect of one shareable promo code on the recipients’ purchase likelihood is larger than the effect 
of two promo codes (one non-shareable and the other shareable). 
To summarize, each hypothesis and its corresponding incentive design aims speaking to a distinctive social 
sharing motive. This enables us to examine the different social sharing motives under a comprehensive 
framework and to quantify the comparative effects of the different incentive designs within a coherent 
framework. To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies employing randomized experimentation 
in both field and laboratory settings. In study 1, we conducted a field experiment in which the incentive 
shareability and quantity were manipulated in the post-sharing traffic of a leading online deal platform. In 
study 2, we used a lab experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), with which we replicated the 
effects of the treatments on senders’ purchase in the field experiment while directly measuring and testing 
the potential mechanism underlying such effects. In study 3, we performed another lab experiment on 
MTurk that aims to explore the potential explanations on the effects of the treatments on senders’ successful 
referral in the field experiment. 
Study 1: Randomized Field Experiment  
In this study, we design and implement a randomized field experiment in collaboration with a leading 
online deal platform (hereafter referred as our partner platform) to examine the causal impact of incentive 
design on users’ purchasing behavior after social sharing. The partner platform offers a wide variety of 
limited-time deals at relatively high discount rates, from travel, events, dining to products, and has attracted 
a substantial customer base. Users of the platform can directly purchase a deal through the deal page or 
share the deal with their social connections. Social sharing can occur either before or after purchase, 
realized by users clicking through the prominently displayed sharing buttons. Although a considerable 
number of social shares are made on the partner platform every day, only a small percentage of the shares 
finally convert to purchases. On average, less than 6% of the social sharing senders and 3% of the social 
sharing recipients purchase their shared deals on the platform. Lifting the purchase likelihood for the 
senders and recipients in the sharing traffic would effectively translate to increased profits for the partner 
platform. Our field experiment aims to investigate the effectiveness of different incentive designs in 
monetizing the social sharing traffic.  
Experimental Design  
Our field experiment employs a between-subjects design. In particular, we focus on the organic social 
sharing senders who had shared deals with their social connections in the previous day but did not end up 
purchasing the shared deal themselves. We randomly assign eligible subjects into one of the five 
experimental groups, as presented in Table 1, and then target them with different treatments. The 
treatments vary by the shareability as well as the quantity of the available promo-codes. The platform 
observes the sender as well as the shared deal for every share through the platform and can target email 
promotions in real time after observing such sharing. It is notable that we deliver unique promo-code(s) for 
each subject in the experiment (i.e., each promo code with a different number), which enables us to 
accurately track the subsequent purchase behaviors at an individual level. In addition, the non-shareable 
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promo code is directly linked with the user ID of the sender and thus cannot be used by any other user, and 
the senders are informed of this in the experiment.  
Table 1. Experimental Groups in the Field Experiment 
Experimental 
Group 
Treatment  Example 
Group 0 Hold-out group. No email N/A 
Group 1 Email reminder that asks the sender to 
purchase the deal she just shared 
Thanks for sharing this great deal! 
Just make sure you don’t miss it for 
yourself. 
Group 2 Email reminder with one non-
shareable 15% promo code for the 
sender to purchase the shared deal 
Thanks for sharing this great deal! 
Now you can get it for an extra 15% 
off. Just use code SHAREa_FAKE at 
checkout. 
Group 3 Email reminder with one shareable 
15% promo code. The sender can either 
use it herself or pass it on to a friend. 
Thanks for sharing this great deal! 
Now your friend (or you) can get it for 
an extra 15% off. Use code 
SHAREa_FAKE now or pass on the 
savings to someone else. 
Group 4 Email reminder with two 15% promo 
codes, one non-shareable and the 
other shareable. 
Thanks for sharing this great deal! 
Now, you (and your friend) can get it 
for an extra 15% off. Use code 
SHAREa_FAKE at checkout and 
share code SHAREb_FAKE. 
Table 1. Experimental Groups in the Field Experiment 
Procedure 
The experiment was implemented for a period of seven weeks. Our treatments were designed as part of the 
partner platform’s email notification systems. The treatment emails, as shown in Figure 1, were delivered 
to eligible subjects once a day at the same time during the experiment. Each user on the platform is eligible 
to receive the treatment at most once during the test period. The randomization happens after a sender’s 
share, by which incentives in the email are completely orthogonal to the sender’s sharing behavior. Thus, 
any difference in the sender’s purchase and sharing behaviors can be directly attributed to the difference in 
the received incentives. After receiving the notification emails, depending on the experimental groups, the 
senders could take several different actions. For example, the participant might completely ignore the 
incentive and not make any purchase. Alternatively, the sender could use the incentive to order the deal 
herself. Further, the sender in the sharable code groups could pass on the incentive to another user, and 
then the user could use the promo code to purchase the deal. Given these possibilities, we focus on two key 
outcomes in the experiment: senders’ purchase likelihood and senders’ successful referral. The first 
outcome reflects the conversion of social sharing senders after treatment, and the second outcome sheds 
light on whether the impact of the treatment has extended beyond the targeted senders. 
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Figure 1.  Screenshots from the Field Experiment 
 
Since our experiment was conducted in a networked environment, we address any potential spillover issues 
in our study following the standard approach in prior literature (Aral and Walker 2012; Bapna and Umyarov 
2015). To begin with, social shares in the daily deal context are highly sparse (Sun et al. 2017). Thus, given 
the randomized nature of our experiment, treatment spillover among senders is of less concern. One 
possible case of sender contamination is that a certain sender in one social share may also be the recipient 
in another social share. As a result, we exclude those few senders in our sample. Meanwhile, treatment 
spillover among recipients happens when a recipient was exposed to different treatments or the same 
treatment multiple times about the same product. Accordingly, we exclude the contaminated recipients who 
composes a very small subset of our sample. Further, in rare cases there are recipients who receive shares 
from different senders about multiple products. We exclude all other shares related to those recipients 
except for the first one, which has a negligible impact on our sample size (< 0.5% of all social shares).  
We assess the validity of our randomization by conducting t-tests for mean comparisons across observable 
covariates, including sender characteristics such as number of past purchases, total past spending, user 
tenure, and number of past shares with the recipient, as well as deal characteristics like deal price and 
number of deal shares. The results of the pairwise comparisons tests show that there is no statistically 
significant difference between any pair of experimental groups in any aspect. The randomization check 
confirms that the pre-experiment purchase level for senders and the price of deals are comparable across 
all test groups. Further, we verify the balance with regard to deal category (i.e., a list of dummies for every 
major deal category in the experiment - for example, restaurant, entertainment, apparel and accessories, 
etc.), and find no significant difference for all deal categories. Finally, we also find a balance between control 
and treatments with respect to the recipient characteristics.  
Data 
We observe proprietary data on deal information as well as users’ social shares and purchase information 
through the partner platform. In total, we obtain a large-size random sample that includes more than 
20,000 unique senders. For every email-mediated social share, we create uniquely hashed identifiers for 
the sender using customer ID, the recipient using hashed email address, the shared deal through deal ID, 
along with the assigned experimental group key. Meanwhile, we also record data on the purchase status of 
the social sharing sender (for example, pre- or post-purchase share), the timestamps of share and purchase, 
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and the purchase status of the sender’ following referral. Essentially, the constructed final dataset enables 
us to analyze the role of incentive design at a granular level, such as its average treatment effect on the 
sender’s and recipient’s purchases, and potential heterogeneous treatment effects based on sender, 
recipient, and product characteristics.  The key variables in our study include sender’s purchase and 
sender’s successful referral. Sender’s purchase refers to the purchase likelihood of a social share sender in 
the experiment (1 = purchase, 0 = no purchase), and sender’s successful referral is defined as the purchase 
likelihood of a social share recipient in the experiment (1 = purchase, 0 = no purchase). Table 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the two outcome variables. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean St.d. Min Max 
Sender’s purchase  20,375 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Sender’s successful referral  20,375 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Results 
We begin with reporting the bar graphs and the pairwise comparisons of group means for our outcome of 
interest, namely, sender’s own purchase and sender’s successful referral. Figure 2 presents the bar graphs 
of the average likelihood of purchase across experimental groups. The error bars in the graphs reflect the 
95% confidence interval. We find that different incentive designs significantly influence sender’s own 
purchase likelihood and sender’s successful referral, but in distinct ways. Additionally, the mean 
comparisons results using two-tailed t-tests, as reported in Table 3 and 4, conform to our graphical 
evidence. Considering the purchase likelihood of social sharing senders, we observe a significant increase 
of senders’ purchase likelihood in the one non-shareable promo code group (Mone non-shareable promo code = .066), 
relative to the simple reminder group (Msimple reminder = .049; t = 3.470, p = .001), the one shareable promo 
code group (Mone shareable promo code = .056; t = 2.080, p = .038), and two promo codes group (Mtwo codes = .054; 
t = 2.480, p = .013). Thus, hypothesis 1a, 1b and 1c is supported. Next, we examine outcome as to the 
likelihood of sender’s successful referral. It appears that the senders’ successful referral likelihood is 
significantly higher in the one shareable promo code group (Mone shareable promo code = .036), compared to the 
simple reminder group (Msimple reminder = .025; t = 2.940, p = .003), the one non-shareable promo code group 
(Mone non-shareable promo code = .028; t = 1.990, p = .047), and the two promo codes group (Mtwo codes = .029; t = 
1.880, p = .060). Thus, hypothesis 2a and 2b are confirmed. 
We further perform estimations on the average treatment effects using regressions, which could produce 
the estimates with higher efficiency than pairwise t-tests (Duflo et al. 2007). Since our outcome variable 
(i.e., purchase likelihood) is binary in nature, we employed both a linear probability model (LPM) and a 
logistic regression, with one being a robustness check to the other. Our results from the regressions are 
perfectly consistent with the above tests in Table 3 and 4, and further confirm the hypothesis. 
     
                           a. Sender’s Purchase                                                      b. Sender’s successful referral 
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Figure 2.  Purchase Likelihood by Group in the Field Experiment 
 
Table 3. Mean Comparisons by Group in Sender’s Purchase 
Two-sample t-Tests Mean Contrast Diff. t p-value 
Reminder vs. Hold-out .049 vs. .040 0.009  1.780  0.074  
One non-shar. vs. Hold-out .066 vs. .040 0.026  5.320  0.000  
One shar. vs. Hold-out .056 vs. .040 0.016  3.190  0.001  
Two codes vs. Hold-out .054 vs. .040 0.014  2.800  0.005  
One non-shar. vs. Reminder .066 vs. .049 0.017  3.470  0.001  
One shar.  vs. Reminder .056 vs. .049 0.007  1.380  0.167  
Two codes vs. Reminder  .054 vs. .049 0.005  1.000  0.318  
One shar.  vs. One non-shar.  .056 vs. .066 -0.010  -2.080  0.038  
Two codes vs. One non-shar.   .054 vs. .066 -0.012  -2.480  0.013  
Two codes vs. One shar. .054 vs. .056 -0.002  -0.390  0.698  
Table 3. Mean Comparisons by Groups in Sender’s Purchase 
Table 4. Mean Comparisons by Groups in Sender’s Successful Referral 
Reminder vs. Hold-out .025 vs. .025 0.000  -0.060  0.949  
One non-shar. vs. Hold-out .028 vs. .025 0.003  0.910  0.362  
One shar. vs. Hold-out .036 vs. .025 0.011  2.920  0.003  
Two codes vs. Hold-out .029 vs. .025 0.004  1.020  0.309  
One non-shar. vs. Reminder .028 vs. .025 0.004  0.960  0.337  
One shar.  vs. Reminder .036 vs. .025 0.011  2.940  0.003  
Two codes vs. Reminder  .029 vs. .025 0.004  1.060  0.287  
One shar.  vs. One non-shar.  .036 vs. .028 0.007  1.990  0.047  
Two codes vs. One non-shar.   .029 vs. .028 0.000  0.100  0.917  
Two codes vs. One shar. .029 vs. .036 -0.007  -1.880  0.060  
Reminder vs. Hold-out .025 vs. .025 0.000  -0.060  0.949  
Table 4. Mean Comparisons by Group in Sender’s Successful Referral 
Discussion 
Study 1 offers several interesting insights. To begin with, the incentive design with one non-shareable 
promo code significantly increases the sender’s probability of purchasing the shared deal as measured by 
the increased usage of promo codes. Further, when the one promo code becomes shareable, we observe that 
the incentive design with one shareable promo code leads to an increase in the sender’s successful referral 
at the expense of the sender’s own purchase. The effects of these incentive designs are not only of statistical 
significance but also of economic significance. Given the large volume of social shares through the partner 
platform, the estimated increase in revenue from such intervention accrues to hundreds and thousands of 
dollars per year. The principle advantage of the field experiment is study 1’s ability to directly manipulate 
and accurately measure the effects of incentive shareability and quantity on the outcomes related to senders’ 
purchases and their successful referrals. Although the field experiment successfully established internal and 
external validity, study 1 sheds limited light on the underlying mechanisms of the observed relationships. 
As such, we complement study 1 with the following studies 2 and 3 that aim to examine the possible 
mechanisms with MTurk experiments.  
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Study 2: MTurk Experiment  
– Mediating Role of Exclusivity on Sender’s Purchase   
The primary goals of Study 2 were to investigate the plausible explanation underlying the main effect of the 
one non-shareable promo code on the senders’ purchase likelihood, while also testing the robustness of our 
findings in the field experiment. In this MTurk experiment, we explore the idea that a promotion with one 
non-shareable promo code is more likely to be perceived as exclusive, compared to the promotions with 
either one shareable promo code or two promo codes. Using a between-subject design, study 2 manipulates 
the shareability and quantity of promo codes, and also directly measures the perceived exclusivity of each 
promotion scenario. As last, due to the limitation of lab experimentation, instead of observing the 
participants’ real-life purchases, we measure the senders’ purchase intention in study 2. 
Procedure 
We conducted the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The participants were randomly 
assigned into the either of the three groups: the one non-shareable code group, the one shareable code 
group, and the two promo codes group. In order to mimic the scenario in the field experiment (i.e., Study 
1), the subjects were asked to visit Groupon.com and select a deal that they hope to share to a friend. As an 
attention check, the participants were required to copy and paste the link of the deal page in a text response 
question.  
After having submitted the deal link, the participants would enter into a scenario of receiving post-sharing 
promotion, which varies by the experimental groups. As a manipulation check, the participants were asked 
to point out the shareability and quantity of promo codes in that promotion scenario. Upon completing the 
manipulation check, the participants were then asked to report i) their perceptions of the exclusivity of the 
promotion, ii) their intention to share the promotion to a friend, and iii) their intention to use the promotion 
to buy the deal/product. Perceived exclusivity was measured on a 11-point Likert scale, using three items 
adapted from (Barone and Roy 2009). We measure the purchasing and sharing intentions, each separately, 
on a single-item 11-point scale, consistent with Wilcox et al. (2009). At the end of the experiment, we 
implanted a screener question using the instructional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al. 2009) 
that aims to screen out the inattentive respondents. 
Results 
We obtained the effective responses from 107 workers who had passed the manipulation and the attention 
checks in the questionnaire. The demographic measures indicate that the participants have an average age 
of 34.85 with a gender composition of 35 females and 72 males. Around 74.77% of the participants have a 
bachelor’s degree or higher; around 72.90% of the participants report a household income of 30,000 or 
higher; and around 98.13% of the workers shop monthly online or more frequently.  
Before further analysis, we examined the reliability and validity of exclusivity measurement. Cronbach’s 
alpha for perceived exclusivity items was 0.96, suggesting adequate internal reliability for the exclusivity 
construct (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991). In addition, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to 
assess the convergent and discriminant validity of the exclusivity construct (Härdle and Simar 2007). The 
EFA result with varimax-rotation suggests that the items belong to one factor with loading being greater 
than 0.92 on each item. Further test on the average variance extracted (AVE) shows AVE value being great 
than .89, validating the convergent validity of our measurement items (Fornell and Larcker 198). 
Our first important question concerned whether subjects’ purchase intention and the perceived promotion 
exclusivity vary across the experimental groups. The patterns of the means for both constructs are 
illustrated in Figure 2. Further t-tests of suggest that the participants perceive the promotion with one non-
shareable code to be significantly more exclusive than the promotions with either one-shareable code (Mone 
non-shareable promo code = 7.757 vs. Mone shareable promo code = 6.545; t = 2.50, p = .014) or two codes (M two codes = 6.541; 
t = 2.58, p = .011). Meanwhile, the participants reported significantly higher purchase intention in the 
promotion scenario with one non-shareable code than those in the promotion scenarios with either one-
shareable code (Mone non-shareable promo code = 6.784 vs. Mone shareable promo code = 4.081; t = 4.13, p < .001) or two 
codes (M two codes = 3.360; t = 5.38, p < .001). 
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                   a. Sender’s purchase intention                                      b. Perceived incentive exclusivity 
Figure 3.  Purchase Intention and Perceived Exclusivity by Group in Study 2 
 
To further investigate the role of perceived exclusivity in the relationship between the experimental groups 
and purchase intention, we performed the Sobel-Goodman mediation tests, using a bias-corrected 
bootstrapping procedure. Specifically, we used the bootstrap command in tandem with the sgmediation 
package in Stata, employing exclusivity as the mediator. Considering the fact that the experimental group 
vary by two key constructs, namely incentive shareability (i.e., one non-shareable vs. one shareable code) 
and quantity (i.e., one non-shareable code vs. two codes). We conducted a set of two mediation analyses, 
with the dependent variable being the purchase intention and the independent variables being shareability 
and quantity separately. The results of the mediation analyses are reported in Table 5.  
Table 5. Mediation Analyses in Study 2 
Biased corrected indirect effect on purchase intention through promotion exclusivity 
 Estimate Bootstrap S.E. Bootstrap Confidence Interval 
Shareability –1.200 .334 [–2.009, –.657] 
Quantity –.977 .284 [–1.713, –.522] 
Table 5. Mediation Analyses in Study 2 
In the first set of the mediation analysis, the indirect effect of incentive shareability on purchase intention, 
through exclusivity, yielded a 95% confidence interval that did not contain zero (95% CI = [–2.009, –.657]). 
Meanwhile, in the second set of the mediation analysis, the indirect effect of incentive quantity on purchase 
intention, through exclusivity, yielded a 95% confidence interval that did not contain zero (95% CI = [–
1.713, –.522]). These results indicate that perceived exclusivity indeed mediates the effects from the 
incentive shareability and quantity to purchase intention. Therefore, we conclude that perceive exclusivity 
could be a candidate underlying mechanism that drives the effects of one non-shareable promo code on 
sender’s purchase intention in the study 2 and the sender’s real purchase in the field experiment. 
Discussion 
The primary purpose of Study 2 were to explore the plausible explanation on the main effect of the one non-
shareable promo code on the senders’ purchase likelihood, while also replicating the main findings in the 
field experiment. By directly measuring the perceived exclusivity, Study 2 provided direct evidence for 
perceived exclusivity being a plausible mechanism underlying the main effect between one non-shareable 
promo code and senders’ purchase intention.   
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Study 3: MTurk Experiment  
– Mediating Role of Social Motives on Sender’s Successful Referral 
The primary goal of study 3 was to investigate the plausible explanation on the main effect of the incentive 
scarcity (i.e., one shareable promo code vs. two promo codes) on the probability of senders’ successful 
referrals, while also examining the robustness of our findings in the field experiment. Guided by the logical 
considerations in the hypothesis development, we explore the idea of social motives that include perceived 
altruism and social image (Andreoni 1990; Ariely et al. 2009). Prior literature suggests that there exists a 
reinforcing relationship between individuals’ altruistic action and their interests in building a social image 
(Benabou and Tirole 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Therefore, in study 3, we consider that the 
senders might experience a greater sense of altruism and a higher tendency to build social image when 
sharing the only one promo code compared to two promo codes. It is possible that the sender’s social 
motives would play a significant role in the probability of successful referral. 
Procedure 
Study 3 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Considering that the one non-shareable 
promo code does not support further referral, study 3 mainly compares two experimental groups: the one 
shareable promo code group and the two promo codes group. In study 3, we also used a between-subjects 
design and randomly assigned participants to either of the two experimental groups. Following study 2 that 
mimics the scenario in the field experiment, the subjects were asked to visit a deal page on Groupon.com 
that they hope to share with a friend. As an attention check, the participants were required to input the 
name and the link of the deal and then walked in a scenario of receiving post-sharing promotion and 
complete a manipulation check on the scenario accordingly. We then asked the participants to report i) 
their social sharing tendency, ii) social motives behind sharing, and iii) the name of the friend intended to 
share the incentive to as well as their confidence that the friend would use the shared incentive. We 
measured the social motives, namely, perceived altruism and social image, with two items on an 11-point 
Likert scale adapted from Ryu and Feick (2007). Consistent with study 2, we measure the sharing intentions 
on a single-item 11-point Likert scale (Wilcox et al. 2009). Similarly, the perceived confidence was also 
measured on an 11-point Likert scale. At the end of the experiment, we asked the participants about the 
perceived realism of the scenario (Morales et al. 2017) and also employed a screener question using the 
instructional manipulation check (IMC, Oppenheimer et al. 2009) that aims to screen out the inattentive 
respondents.  
Results 
We obtained the effective responses from 106 workers who had passed the manipulation and the attention 
checks in the questionnaire. The demographic measures indicate that the participants have an average age 
of 35.58 with a gender composition of 33 female and 73 male participants. Around 66.04% of the 
participants have a bachelor’s degree or higher; around 70.75% of the participants report a household 
income of 30,000 or higher; and around 96.23% of the workers shop monthly online or more frequently. 
Finally, the participants report an average of 4.57 out of 5.0 in perceived scenario realism, validating the 
realistic design of study 3. 
Our first question concerns whether subjects’ social motives vary across the experimental groups. The 
results in study 3 show that the participants in the one shareable promo code group report significantly 
higher perceived altruism (Mone-shareable code = 7.76 vs. Mtwo codes = 4.02, p < .01) and greater intention to 
convey their altruistic social image (Mone-shareable code = 6.20 vs. Mtwo codes = 3.11, p < .01) than those in the two 
promo codes group. These findings suggest that the senders show greater social motives with one promo 
code vs. two codes. Next, we examine the senders’ perceived confidence of successful referral. Our results 
show that the participants in the one shareable promo code group report stronger confidence that their 
friend would use the incentive to buy the deal (Mone-shareable code = 7.80 vs. Mtwo codes = 6.04, p < .01). The 
patterns of the constructs are illustrated in Figure 4. 
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                              a. Perceived Altruism                                                     b. Social Image 
 
                                                          c. Confidence on Successful Referral  
Figure 4.  Modified Research Model 
 
To further investigate the role of social motives in the relationship between the incentive scarcity and 
successful referral, we performed the mediation tests, using a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure.1 
Specifically, we used the bootstrap command in tandem with the sureg command in Stata, employing 
perceived altruism and social image as the mediators. We conducted the mediation analysis with the 
dependent variable being the perceived confidence and the independent variable being incentive scarcity. 
The results of the mediation analyses are reported in Table 6. In the mediation analysis, the indirect effect 
of incentive scarcity on referral confidence, through perceived altruism, yielded a 95% confidence interval 
that did not contain zero (95% CI = [–2.472, –.099]). Meanwhile, the indirect effect of incentive scarcity on 
referral confidence, through social image, yielded a 95% confidence interval that did not contain zero (95% 
CI = [–1.324, –.021]). These results indicate that perceived altruism and social image indeed mediates the 
effects from the incentive scarcity to sender’s confidence on successful referral. Therefore, we conclude that 
social motives could be a candidate underlying mechanism that drives the effects of one shareable promo 
code (vs. two codes) on a sender’s successful referral in the field experiment. 
Table 6. Mediation Analyses in Study 3 
Biased corrected indirect effect on confidence of successful referral  
 Estimate Bootstrap S.E. Bootstrap Confidence Interval 
 
1 Again, our approach is similar to the bootstrap test proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2008).  
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Perceived altruism –1.187 .617 [–2.472, –.099] 
Social image –.537 .332 [–1.324, –.021] 
Table 6. Mediation Analyses in Study 3 
Discussion 
The principle advantage of study 3 is the ability to directly measure and test the potential roles of the 
perceived altruism and social image in a straightforward manner. The results of this study are compatible 
with our theoretical framework, which assumes that consumer derives utility from sharing an incentive with 
a friend. This study also shows consistent evidence with the field experiment on the likelihood of successful 
referral with one shareable promo code. Therefore, study 3 supplemented the first two studies by providing 
direct evidence on the perceived altruism and social image being the plausible mechanisms underlying the 
main effect between incentive scarcity and senders’ successful referral.  
Conclusion 
We report on a series of randomized experiments in both field and lab settings that demonstrated how firms 
can use incentive designs to effectively monetize sharing traffic in the context of online platforms. Our study 
highlights the importance of understanding the motives behind online sharing and shows that the 
effectiveness of the incentive designs critically depends on the motivations of the senders who share 
information with their social connections at the first place. The results of our study also suggest that firms 
can customize incentive designs based on the underlying motives of the senders. With the rapid 
advancement in firms’ capabilities to process large amounts of data and to analyze real-time consumer 
behaviors, we envision that in the near future firms can further prefect these incentive designs and deliver 
them in real time in a personalized fashion. Our work serves as a valuable proof-of-concept of this 
impending development. Moreover, we foresee ample research opportunities to build on this line of work. 
It is our hope that future research can extend on our study, and further explore various moderators to shed 
light on the variations in the treatment effects for additional observable covariates. 
References 
Andreoni, J. 1989. Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal 
of political Economy (97:6), pp.1447-1458. 
Andreoni, J., 1990. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. The 
Economic Journal. (100:401), pp.464-477. 
Andreoni, J., J. Miller. 2002. Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of 
preferences for altruism. Econometrica. 70(2) 737–753. 
Andreoni, J., & Bernheim, B. D. 2009. Social image and the 50-50 norm: A theoretical and 
 experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica (77:5), pp.1607-1636. 
Ansari, A., C. F. Mela. 2003. E-customization. Journal of Marketing Research. 40(2) 131–145. 
Aral, S., D. Walker. 2011. Creating social contagion through viral product design: A randomized trial of peer 
influence in networks. Management Science. 57(9) 1623–1639.   
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., S. Meie. 2009. Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives 
in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review (99:1), pp.544-55. 
Ba S., J. Stallaert, A. B. Whinston. 2001. Introducing a third dimension in information systems design - The 
case for incentive alignment. Information Systems Research. 12(3) 225–239. 
Bapna, R., A. Umyarov. 2015. Do your online friends make you pay? A randomized field experiment on peer 
influence in online social networks. Management Science. 61(8) 1902–1920. 
Bardsley, N. 2008. Dictator game giving: Altruism or artefact?. Experimental Economics. 11(2) 122–133. 
Belk, R. 2010. Sharing. Journal of Consumer Research. 36(5) 715–734. 
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. 2006. Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review (96:5), 
pp.1652-1678. 
Benkler, Y. 2004. Sharing nicely: On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of 
economic production. Yale Law Journal. 273–358. 
Berger J., K. L. Milkman. 2012. What makes online content viral?. Journal of Marketing Research. 49(2) 
192–205. 
 Designing Promotion Incentive to Embrace Social Sharing 
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 16 
Burtch G., Y. Hong, R. Bapna, V. Griskevicius. 2017. Stimulating online reviews by combining financial 
incentives and social norms. Management Science, forthcoming.  
Cabral, L., L. Li. 2015. A dollar for your thoughts: Feedback-conditional rebates on eBay. Management 
Science. 61(9) 2052–2063. 
Cespedes, F. V. 2015. Is social media actually helping your company’s bottom line? Harvard Business 
Review. Available at: https://hbr.org/2015/03/is-social-media-actually-helping-your-companys-
bottom-line. 
Chen, Y., S. X. Li. 2009. Group identity and social preferences. The American Economic Review. 99(1) 431–
457. 
Chen, Y., X. Li. 2013. Group buying commitment and sellers’ competitive advantages. Journal of Economics 
& Management Strategy. 22(1) 164–183. 
Chandon, P., B. Wansink, G. Laurent. 2000. A benefit congruency framework of sales promotion 
effectiveness. Journal of Marketing. 64(4) 65–81. 
Cramton, C. D. 2002. Finding common ground in dispersed collaboration. Organizational 
Dynamics. 30(4) 356–367. 
Duell, D. 2015. Salient group identity, self- and group-regarding behavior, and the strategic nature of 
identity voting, working paper 
Duflo, E., R. Glennerster, M. Kremer. 2007. Using randomization in development economics research: A 
toolkit. Handbook of Development Economics. 4 3895–3962. 
Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher. 2003. The nature of human altruism. Nature. 425(6960) 785–791. 
Fleder, D., K. Hosanagar. 2009. Blockbuster culture's next rise or fall: The impact of recommender systems 
on sales diversity. Management Science. 55(5) 697–712. 
Fong, N. M., Y. Zhang, X. Luo, X. Wang. 2016. Targeted promotions and cross-category spillover effects. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847635. 
Gerlitz, C., A. Helmond. 2013. The like economy: Social buttons and the data-intensive web. New Media & 
Society. 15(8) 1348–1365. 
Ghose, A., S. Yang. 2009. An empirical analysis of search engine advertising: Sponsored search in electronic 
markets. Management Science. 55(10) 1605–1622. 
Godes, D., D. Mayzlin, Y. Chen, S. Das, C. Dellarocas, B. Pfeiffer, B. Libai, S. Sen, M. Shi, P. Verlegh. 2005. 
The firm's management of social interactions. Marketing Letters. 16(3/4) 415–428. 
Godinho de Matos M, Pedro F, Rodrigo B. Target the Ego or Target the Group: Evidence from a Randomized 
Experiment in Proactive Churn Management. Marketing Science. 2018 Aug 28;37(5):793-811. 
Goldfarb, A., C. Tucker. 2011. Online display advertising: Targeting and obtrusiveness. Marketing 
Science. 30(3) 389–404. 
Hanna, J. E., M. K. Tanenhaus, J. C. Trueswell. 2003. The effects of common ground and perspective on 
domains of referential interpretation. Journal of Memory and Language. 49(1) 43–61. 
Hevner, A. R., S. T. March, J. Park, S. Ram. 2004. Design science in information systems research. MIS 
Quarterly. 28(1) 75–105. 
Hinz O., B. Skiera, C. Barrot, J. U. Becker. 2011. Seeding strategies for viral marketing: An empirical 
comparison. Journal of Marketing. 75(6) 55–71.   
Hoffman, M. L. 1981. Is altruism part of human nature?. Journal of Personality and social 
Psychology. 40(1) 121. 
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, V. L. Smith. 1996. Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator 
games. The American Economic Review. 86(3) 653–660. 
Hong, Y., P. A. Pavlou, N. Shi, K. Wang. 2017. On the role of fairness and social distance in designing 
effective social referral systems. MIS Quarterly. 41(3) 787–809. 
Huang, N., P. Chen, Y. Hong, S. Wu. 2018. Digital nudging for online social sharing: Evidence from a 
randomized field experiment. In 2018 51th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
(HICSS). Big Island, HI. 
Jedidi, K., C. F. Mela, S. Gupta. 1999. Managing advertising and promotion for long-run 
profitability. Marketing Science. 18(1) 1–22. 
Jing, X., J. Xie. 2011. Group buying: A new mechanism for selling through social interactions. Management 
science. 57(8) 1354–1372. 
John, N. A. 2013. The social logics of sharing. The Communication Review. 16(3) 113–131. 
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, R. Thaler. 1986. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in 
the market. The American Economic Review. 728–741. 
Khalil, E. L. 2004. What is altruism?. Journal of Economic Psychology. 25(1) 97–123. 
 Designing Promotion Incentive to Embrace Social Sharing 
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 17 
Kim, Y., J. Srivastava. 2007. Impact of social influence in e-commerce decision making. In Proceedings of 
the Ninth International Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM.  293–302. 
Kornish, L. J., Q. Li. 2010. Optimal referral bonuses with asymmetric information: Firm-offered and 
interpersonal incentives. Marketing Science. 29(1) 108–121. 
Kranton, R., M. Pease, S. Sanders, S. Huettel. 2013. Identity, groups, and social preferences. Duke 
University, mimeo. Available at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/52c4/3f7403316f8989157d00f43d4d7a5ba4c06b.pdf 
Krebs, D. L. 1970. Altruism: An examination of the concept and a review of the literature. Psychological 
Bulletin. 73(4) 258. 
Kumar, V., B. Rajan. 2012. Social coupons as a marketing strategy: A multifaceted perspective. Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science. 40(1) 120–136. 
Lacetera, N., M. Macis, R. Slonim. 2014. Rewarding altruism? A natural field experiment. Management 
Science. 60(5), 1107-1129 
Lacetera, B. N., M. Macis, R. Slonim. 2012. Will there be blood? Incentives and displacement effects in pro-
social behavior. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 4(1) 186–223. 
Lambrecht, A., T. Catherine. 2013. When does retargeting work? Information specificity in online 
advertising. Journal of Marketing Research. 50(5) 561–576. 
Leider, S., M. M. Möbius, T. Rosenblat, Q. A. Do. 2009. Directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social 
networks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 124(4) 1815–1851. 
Li, X., L. Wu. 2017. Measuring effects of observational learning and social-network word-of-mouth (WOM) 
on the sales of daily-deal vouchers. Information Systems Research. forthcoming. 
List, J. A. 2007. On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political Economy 115(3) 482–
493. 
Luo, X., J. Zhang. 2013. How do consumer buzz and traffic in social media marketing predict the value of 
the firm?. Journal of Management Information Systems. 30(2) 213–238. 
Manchanda P., Y. Xie, N. Youn. 2008. The role of targeted communication and contagion in product 
adoption. Marketing Science. 27(6) 961–976. 
Moriguchi, T., G. Xiong, X. Luo. 2016. Retargeting ads for shopping cart recovery: Evidence from online 
field experiments. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847631. 
Nielsen. 2016. Nielsen Social Media Report. Available at: 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2017/2016-nielsen-social-media-report.html. 
Ozpolat, K., G. Gao, J. Wolfgang, S. Viswanathan. 2013. The value of third-party assurance seals in online 
retailing: An empirical investigation. Information Systems Research. 24(4) 1100–1111. 
Price, J. A. 1975. Sharing: The integration of intimate economies. Anthropologica. 3–27. 
Ryu, G., L. Feick. 2007. A penny for your thoughts: Referral reward programs and referral 
likelihood. Journal of Marketing. 71(1) 84–94. 
Sahni, N., D. Zou, P. K. Chintagunta. 2014. Effects of targeted promotions: Evidence from field 
experiments. Available at: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/rp3243.pdf 
Schmitt P, B. Skiera, C. Van den Bulte. 2011. Referral Programs and Customer Value. Journal of Marketing. 
75(1) 46–59. 
Simon H. A. 1955. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of  
 Economics. 69(1) 99–118. 
Simon, H. A. 1981. Economic rationality: Adaptive artifice. The Sciences of the Artificial (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA).  
Sun, T., S. Viswanathan, E. Zheleva. 2017. Creating social contagion through firm mediated message design: 
Evidence from a randomized field experiment. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2543864  
Wasko, M. M., S. Faraj. 2005. Why should I share? Examining social capital and knowledge contribution 
in electronic networks of practice. MIS Quarterly. 29(1) 35–57. 
Weiss, R. F., J. L. Boyer, J. P. Lombardo, M. H. Stich 1973. Altruistic drive and altruistic 
reinforcement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 25(3) 390. 
Zhu, L., I. Benbasat, Z. Jiang. 2010. Let's shop online together: An empirical investigation of collaborative 
online shopping support. Information Systems Research. 21(4) 872–891. 
